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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20000280-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

DON BROKMEYER,
Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to suppress the psilocybin (mushrooms) seized following a traffic stop.
"The factualfindingsunderlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1247
(Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996).
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
relevant to a determination of this case. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const., amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, and two misdemeanor offenses not relevant to this appeal. R. 07-08.
Defendant moved to suppress the psilocybin (mushrooms) which formed the basis of the
controlled substance charge. R. 09-13. After the preliminary hearing, which also served as
the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the court denied defendant's motion. R.
28: 69-73. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful
possession of a controlled substance and to the invalid registration charge. R. 22.1 The
insurance charge was dismissed, R. 22. Defendant timely appealed. R. 25.

l

The conditions of the plea were not identified in the minutes nor was a transcript
of the plea hearing prepared and made a part of the record.
2

SUMMARY OF FACTS

While on night patrol on State Route 163 just north of Mexican Hat, Utah, Officer
Glen Begay observed Molly Manelly driving a pickup truck without license plate lights. R.
28: 7-8,53-54. Officer Begay stopped the truck for the equipment violation and spoke with
Manelly and defendant, who was a passenger in the truck. R. 28: 8. Officer Begay asked
Manelly for her driver's license, but she explained that she had forgotten it. R. 28: 13, 54.
Officer Begay also asked for vehicle registration and proof of insurance. R. 28: 8-9.
Defendant told the officer that the truck belonged to him, but neither he nor Manelly was able
to produce valid registration or proof of insurance. R. 28: 19-20.
As Manelly and defendant looked for the requested documentation, Officer Begay
shined his flashlight into the vehicle and observed what appeared to be marijuana seeds on
the floorboard of the truck and a piece of an illegal mushroom in the truck's ashtray. R. 28:
9-10, 13,29.2 Officer Begay asked the two to exit the truck and confronted Manelly about
his suspicions that there were illegal narcotics in the vehicle. See R. 28: 13-14, 16, 54.
When Manelly denied possession, Officer Begay asked defendant if there were any narcotics
in the truck. R. 28:16. After glancing back at the truck, defendant responded affirmatively,
indicating that he had some mushrooms in his jacket pocket R. 28: 16, 48, 50, 53.

2

The trial court declined to make a finding as to whether or not the officer
observed marijuana seeds. R. 28: 69-70. Officer Begay did not confiscate the seeds, and
could offer no helpful description of marijuana seeds other than they were small. See R.
28: 18,28,41-42.
3

Defendant explained that someone gave him the illegal mushrooms a couple of days earlier
at a dance, but claimed that he did not intend to use them. R. 28: 18, 49-50.3
After defendant admitted to having illegal mushrooms in his jacket pocket, Officer
Begay searched the truck. R. 28: 17. He found a small Ziplock bag containing illegal
mushrooms in the pocket of defendant's jacket which was lying on the passenger side of the
truck. R. 28: 17, 40. After finding no other contraband, Officer Begay arrested defendant
and permitted Manelly to drive away. R. 28: 41-42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to his claim on appeal, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress was correct. Defendant concedes that the traffic stop of defendant's pickup truck
for an equipment violation was justified at its inception. Officer Begay's observation of what
appeared to be part of an illegal mushroom in plain view in the truck's ashtray created
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity justifying further investigative
questioning. The trial court's finding that Officer Begay observed part of a mushroom in the
ashtray is adequately supported by the record and is not, therefore, clearly erroneous. The
officer's brief and direct question regarding the existence of narcotics in the truck quickly
confirmed his suspicions of more serious criminal activity. Defendant's admission that there
were illegal mushrooms in his jacket pocket, coupled with the officer's observation of a
mushroom in the ashtray, created probable cause justifying a roadside search of the truck.
3

At the hearing, defendant admitted that he took one of the pieces of mushroom
from the baggie and placed it in the open ashtray. R. 28: 50. He claimed that he took a
piece out "to see what it was." R. 28: 50-51.
4

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FOLLOWING A TRAFFIC STOP
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing
that the evidence did not justify defendant's detention beyond the legitimate purpose of the
stop. See Aplt. Brf. at 6. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
I. OVERVIEW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
Const, amend. IV. "The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
a person's automobile." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App. 262, f 12,988 P.2d 7. This Court
makes a dual inquiry in determining whether a search or seizure following a traffic stop is
reasonable: "(1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception?' and (2) Was the
resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place?'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)
{quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)).
The law is well-settled that an officer who observes a traffic violation is
constitutionally justified in making a stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (Utah 1994). "[Ojnce
the reasons for the initial stop of the vehicle have been completed, the occupants must be
allowed to proceed on their way." State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,158 (Utah App. 1992).
Further detention is permissible if, based on "specific, articulable facts drawn from the

5

totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop," the officer reasonably
believes other criminal activity is afoot. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132; accord State v. Shepard,
955 P.2d 352,355 (Utah App. 1998). A roadside search of the vehicle will be justified under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement if "premised upon probable cause and
exigent circumstances." State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Utah 1996).
II. ANALYSIS
A review of the facts, as known to Officer Begay at the time of the stop, reveals that
the trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion.
A.

The Officer's Stop of Defendant Was Justified at its Inception.
Defendant concedes that the stop, based on the officer's observation of an equipment

violation, was "constitutionally permissible." Aplt Brf. at 6; see also State v. Spurgeon, 904
P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that "an equipment violation also justifies an
investigative stop by law enforcement officers").
B.

The Officer's Observation of an Illegal Mushroom in the Truck's Open
Ashtray Justified Further Investigative Questioning.
Defendant argues that the resulting detention of defendant—when Officer Begay

instructed the occupants to exit the vehicle and asked them if they had any narcotics—was
not justified under the Fourth Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 6. As explained above, Officer
Begay was justified in further detaining defendant if he "reasonably suspected more serious
criminal activity." State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App. 6, f 10,994 P.2d 1278. A review of the

6

record reveals that he had reasonable suspicion to suspect that the occupants were carrying
illicit drugs. Accordingly, continued detention to address that suspicion was justified.
1.

The Trial Court's Finding That the Officer Observed a Mushroom
in the Ashtray Was Adequately Supported by the Record.

Defendant argues that the evidence was inadequate to support the court's factual
findings upon which it concluded further detention was justified. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-10.
"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard." Moreno, 910 P.2d
at 1247. Clear error will not be found unless "the factual findings made by the trial court are
not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah
1994). As explained by the Supreme Court in Pena, the clearly erroneous standard "is highly
deferential to the trial court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties
appear and the evidence is adduced." Id. at 936.
Officer Begay testified that as the driver and defendant attempted to locate the truck's
registration and insurance information, he shined his flashlight into the vehicle and observed
what appeared to be four marijuana seeds on the floorboard of the truck and part of an illegal
mushroom in the ashtray. R. 28: 9-10, 13, 29. Either of these facts, if accepted as true by
the trial court, would justify defendant's continued detention. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132
(holding that "reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity" justifies further
detention for investigative questioning).

7

Although defendant devotes more than half his argument to challenging Officer
Begay's testimony that he observed marijuana seeds on the truck's floorboard, see Aplt. Brf.
at 7-9, the trial court declined to make any finding on that factual issue, basing its decision
instead on Officer Begay's testimony that he observed part of an illegal mushroom in the
truck's ashtray. See R. 28:69-70.4 This Court reviews findings, not testimony, and therefore
there is nothing relating to the marijuana seeds for this Court to review. Accordingly, the
only factual issue on appeal is whether the evidence supported a finding that Officer Begay
observed the mushroom.
Defendant contends that the trial court's finding relating to the mushroom should be
rejected because the officer was unable to adequately describe an illegal mushroom at the
hearing and because he did not include his observation of the mushroom in his police report.
Aplt. Brf. at 10. Defendant's argument lacks merit.

4

The trial court did not, as defendant contends, "fail to take into account the
reasoning underlying the holding in [State v. Maycock]" 947 P.2d 695 (Utah App. 1997),
and conclude "that Maycock was inapplicable because it dealt with the issue of smell as
opposed to sight" Aplt. Brf. at 7-8. On the contrary, noting Maycock 's concern with
fabrication and "self-suggestion", the trial court observed that "[a] reasonable argument
here that an extension of Maycock should require that when someone bases a search on ..
. plain view observation of something that appears to be a controlled substance[,] that in
fairness to the defendant that substance needs to be retrieved and tested." R. 28: 69. The
court concluded that "there's a reasonable argument here that that's something that's
required." R. 28: 69. The court also stated that because the officer was unable to
describe a marijuana seed, there was "some reason to question" the officer's testimony in
that regard. See R. 28: 69-70. The court, however, never reached those issues,
concluding, "All those are very interesting questions, but not in this case because I'm
absolutely convinced that the officer also saw the mushrooms." R. 28: 70.
8

Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the trial court's finding was adequately
supported by the record. In the first place, the trial court could reasonably infer that the
appearance of a mushroom was a matter of common knowledge and known to the officer.
See R. 28: 11. Accordingly, when the prosecutor asked the officer to describe a mushroom,
the court stated, "I think if he's a member of the human race, he knows what mushrooms
look like." R. 28: 11. In the second place, that Officer Begay in fact knew what mushrooms
look like was evidenced by his later testimony. He testified that he attended POST, where
he received training in the identification of narcotics, including illegal mushrooms. R. 28:
12,24-25. He testified that he observed in the ashtray what appeared to be a quarter of the
umbrella-looking top of a mushroom. SeeR. 28:13. 5 He further testified that whereas legal
mushrooms are generally carried "in a little package, like you would find in a store," illegal
mushrooms were generally found "kind of smashed up, inside a little ziplock bag." R. 28:
12. He also testified that illegal mushrooms were usually maintained in a dried condition,
as were the mushrooms found in this case. R. 28: 12. Finally, he testified that illegal
mushrooms are either taken orally or boiled and drank. R. 28:13.
The foregoing evidence was more than adequate to support the trial court's finding
that Officer Begay observed part of a mushroom in the ashtray. Moreover, the trial court
acted well within its discretion as fact finder in concluding that, based on the general purpose
of the report, the officer's failure to include the mushroom observation was sufficiently
5

When the officer testified that he saw a "quarter portion of a mushroom of the top
part of it," the prosecutor asked whether it was the "[t]op part looking like an umbrella,
kind of?" R. 28: 13. The officer responded affirmatively. R. 28: 13.
9

inconsequential to diminish Officer Begay's credibility. See R. 28: 70. Defendant asks this
Court to substitute its judgment, based on the record on appeal, for that of the trial court.
Such is not the role of this Court. Because the witnesses appear and the evidence is adduced
before the trial court, it is "in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to
derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to
garner from a cold record." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. In short, the court's finding that Officer
Begay observed the illegal mushroom in the truck was not clearly erroneous.
2.

The Circumstances at the Time of the Stop Created Reasonable
Suspicion of More Serious Criminal Activity.

The trial court's legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is "reviewed for correctness,
with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247. As noted above, Officer Begay observed a piece of a
dried mushroom head in the ashtray of the pickup truck. R. 28:12. The observation of what
appears to be an illegal mushroom in an ashtray is sufficient in itself to justify further
investigative questioning. In addition to the mushroom, however, neither the driver, nor
defendant, who claimed ownership of the truck, was able to produce any proof of registration
or insurance. R.28:19-20. These facts, taken together, clearly created reasonable suspicion
of more serious criminal activity justifying further detention.
Where, as here, reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity arises, officers
must still limit the scope of the stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. "The officers must
'"diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their

10

suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant."'" Id.
{quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985)) (brackets in original). Officer
Begay did so in this case. He directed defendant to the front of the truck and simply asked
whether any narcotics were in the truck. R. 28: 16. Rather than dispelling any suspicion,
defendant confirmed Officer Begay's suspicions, telling him that "there was some
mushrooms in his jacket." R. 28: 16. This further detention was limited in scope and quick,
focusing on Officer Begay's suspicion of illicit drugs and lasting but a few seconds. The trial
court therefore correctly concluded that Officer Begay was constitutionally justified in
further detaining defendant to explore his suspicion that the occupants possessed illicit drugs.
C.

The Search of the Truck Was Supported by Probable Cause.
Having concluded that the stop was justified at its inception and that Officer Begay5 s

further detention of defendant was justified, this Court need only determine whether the trial
court correctly concluded that the search of defendant's truck was supported by probable
cause.6 See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1236-37. Officer Begay observed what he believed was
an illegal mushroom in the truck's ashtray. R. 28: 12-13. When asked whether he had any
6

Because defendant does not challenge the existence of exigent circumstances
under the automobile exception, this Court need only address probable cause. See State v.
Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187 (Utah App. 1994). In any case, there is no doubt that
exigent circumstances existed here. "Under Utah law c[e]xigent circumstances exist
when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted [to the presence of law enforcement],
and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained . . . [or]
when the safety of police officers is threatened.'" State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah
App. 1998) (quoting Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237)) (brackets in original). All three
requirements were present here.
11

narcotics in the truck, defendant told Officer Begay that he had some mushrooms in his
jacket. R. 28: 16. Officer Begay's observation of the mushroom, together with defendant's
admission that he had illegal mushrooms in his jacket, was more than sufficient to establish
the probable cause necessary to search the truck and the jacket in the truck. See, e.g., State
v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685,691 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that it was "abundantly clear that the
marijuana, an illicit drug, was associated with criminal activity"); see also State v. Wright,
1999 UT App. 86, f 10, 977 P.2d 505 (observing that the lone fact of smelling marijuana
gave the officer probable cause to search). Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that
Officer Begay's search of the truck was supported by probable cause.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Because the briefs adequately address the issues on appeal and because this case
presents no important, novel or complex legal issues, the State does not request oral
argument.
Respectfully submitted this Q

day of September, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^——^gj,
JfifFkEY S. GRAY
~£f
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

1

to suggest that maybe I'm being too hard on the officer.

2

That doesn't make sense.

3

COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS

4

THE COURT: A reasonable argument here that an

5

extension of Mavcock should require that when someone bases a

6

search on, ah, plain view observation of something that

7

appears to be a controlled substance that in fairness to the

8

defendant that substance needs to be retrieved and tested to

9

be sure that, in fact, it's--that's what it is, so that the

10

same kind of thing that happens with your nose doesn't happen

11

with your eyes.

12

remote--the remote possibility of an officer fabricating was

13

not the greatest concern of the Court of Appeals.

14

That was the concern in Mavcock.

The

The greatest concern there was that by

15

self-suggestion, by conjecturing or hoping, you think you see

16

something that you don't actually see.

17

reasonable argument here that that's something that's

18

required.

19

So there's a

There's also reasonable argument in this particular

20

case that if an officer can't tell me, urn, can't describe a

21

marijuana seed in any other way than to say it looks like a

22

marijuana seed.

23

size of a pea seed or the size of a carrot seed or where it

24

fits in between and what the shape of it is, whether it's

25

oval or round or flat with some rounding on top and bottom,

I mean can't even tell me whether it's the

J. M. LIDDELL
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1

pointed on one end, can't tell me any of that, some reason to

2

question.

3

seed really looks like?

4

Does this officer really know what a marijuana

All those are very interesting questions, but not

5

in this case because I'm absolutely convinced that the

6

officer also saw the mushrooms. And whether he put them in

7

the probable cause fact sheet or not does not affect my

8

conviction about that because the probable cause fact--the

9

probable cause fact sheet only needs to contain the

10

information that shows that there is reasonable cause to

11

believe the defendant committed an offense.

12

officer--the whole story that leads up to that is completely

13

irrelevant.

14

And how the

So, ah, everyone agrees it was sitting there in the

15

ashtray in plain sight. And I'm convinced the officer saw

16

it, that he knows, ah, what mushrooms look like and that the

17

circumstances--dry appearance, baggy, just sitting there in a

18

car in an ashtray--indicative of illegal mushroom, as opposed

19

to the legal kind you might buy in a store to saute with a

20

steak.

21

search the vehicle once he saw the mushroom, which he had

22

reasonable cause to believe was, in fact, an illegal

23

mushroom.

24
25

So the officer had probable cause, at that point, to

The remaining question here is whether there was
a--a Miranda violation, and I have to consider five factors
J. M. LIDDELL
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